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OPINION
_______________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a subpoena
enforcement application in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, seeking enforcement of an administrative subpoena it issued to the
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (“UPMC”) pertaining to the EEOC‟s
investigation into a charge of discrimination against The Heritage Shadyside
(“Heritage”), a subsidiary of UPMC.1 The District Court denied the request based on its
holding that the subpoena was a “fishing expedition” for information not relevant to the

1

Heritage is a wholly owned subsidiary of UPMC Senior Communities, Inc., which is a
wholly owned subsidiary of UPMC. Though the subpoena, charge of discrimination, and
the EEOC refer to Heritage as “UPMC-Heritage Shadyside” or “UPMC Heritage Place,”
its correct name is as stated above.
2

charge of discrimination. Because our precedent regarding the enforcement of a
subpoena issued by the EEOC is stronger than perceived by the Court, we vacate the
judgment and remand.2
I. Background
Carol J. Gailey began working for Heritage as a certified nursing assistant in April
2007. She suffers from numerous health conditions. Between November 2007 and
January 2008, Heritage granted Gailey a personal leave of absence (“PLOA”) and shortterm disability benefits in accordance with UPMC‟s policies.3 She returned to work in a
light-duty, part-time capacity. In May 2008, she was granted another PLOA for the
purpose of having cancer surgery. This PLOA expired in June 2008, and Gailey failed to
report to work at the end of the PLOA.
UPMC‟s PLOA policy requires an employee on a PLOA to communicate with her
employer on a regular basis regarding her leave. It also provides that the failure to report
to work on the work day after the leave expires is considered a voluntary resignation.
Because Gailey did not communicate with Heritage or report to work, Heritage treated
her silence as a voluntary resignation and terminated her employment effective the day
after her PLOA expired. Approximately three weeks later, Gailey spoke with Heritage
and was told that her employment had been terminated.
2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1345. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

Gailey had worked for Heritage for seven months at this time. She thus was not eligible
for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., which requires
an employee to have been employed for at least twelve months, or for at least 1,250 hours
of service, by the employer to be eligible for benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).
3

Gailey filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.4 She alleged that Heritage
had discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), because it discharged her without
warning while she was on leave to undergo major surgery. In response, Heritage filed a
position statement that asserted that Gailey‟s termination was not discriminatory because
it resulted from the neutral application of its policy governing personal leave. It attached
UPMC‟s PLOA policy, Disability Income Protection Policy, and certain other policies.
A review of these policies prompted the EEOC to send a request for information to
UPMC (not Heritage). It asked UPMC to identify employees at all of its facilities in the
Pittsburgh region who had been terminated under the PLOA and/or disability policies.
UPMC objected to the scope of the request, and did not provide the information. The
EEOC then served a subpoena on UPMC for the information. It read: “For the period
July 1, 2008, to the present time, provide documents identifying all employees who were
terminated after 14 weeks of a medical leave of absence pursuant to [UPMC]‟s [PLOA]
Policy and/or Disability Income Protection Policy, and/or any other applicable policy.”
App. 24. For each employee identified, it sought ten categories of information.

4

She filed the charge more than 300 days after the date she learned of the alleged
discrimination, which makes the charge untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);
Callowhill v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 832 F.2d 269, 271 (3d Cir. 1987) (“In a state such
as Pennsylvania which has an agency performing functions similar to those of the EEOC,
the time for filing is extended to 300 days . . . .”). Before the District Court, the EEOC
produced an intake questionnaire that Gailey completed within 300 days after she learned
of the alleged discrimination. The issue of whether this questionnaire should be
construed as a timely “charge” is not before us.
4

After denying UPMC‟s petition to revoke or modify the subpoena, the EEOC filed
the subpoena enforcement application. Before the District Court, it stated that “the
purpose of the investigation is to determine if there are any employees who were denied
medical leave in excess of [UPMC]‟s maximum policy limit where such leave would
have been an accommodation and would not have been an undue hardship as defined by
the ADA.” EEOC v. UPMC, 2011 WL 2118274, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2011). The
EEOC similarly noted that it expanded its investigation of Gailey‟s charge to include all
of UPMC‟s facilities because it “discovered evidence of a policy that on its face appears
to bar an entire class of reasonable accommodations.” Id.
The District Court denied the application based on its holding that the information
was not relevant to Gailey‟s charge of discrimination. It commented that “[i]t is readily
apparent that [the] EEOC is interested in pursuing an investigation of UPMC‟s corporate
policies,” which “does not appear to have occurred „during the course of a reasonable
investigation‟” of Gailey‟s charge. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Kronos, Inc., 620 F.3d 287, 297
(3d Cir. 2010)). The Court faulted the EEOC for doing “almost nothing to determine the
specific facts of [Gailey‟s] discharge,” and identified several “narrowly-tailored,
potentially-dispositive inquiries” that the EEOC should have made prior to “launching an
inquiry into a tangential alleged systemic violation.” Id. It further determined that the
EEOC had not “satisfactorily explain[ed] how the information requested in the Subpoena

5

would „cast light‟ on Gailey‟s claim.” Id. (emphasis added). It thus concluded that the
subpoena was a “fishing expedition.”5
II. Discussion
We review a district court‟s decision regarding a subpoena enforcement
application for an abuse of discretion. Kronos, 620 F.3d at 295. A district court abuses
its discretion when it bases its decision on “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. at 295 (quoting Chao v.
Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2007)).
The ADA prohibits, among other things, employers from discriminating against a
qualified individual with a disability or a “class of individuals” with disabilities,
including through the application of neutral policies and by failing to provide reasonable
accommodations absent undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A), (b)(6);
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 39798 (2002); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). Employers and employees are to engage in an
“interactive process” to determine an employee‟s needs and whether a reasonable
accommodation exists. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 771
(3d Cir. 2004). Other Courts of Appeals and the EEOC have concluded that a reasonable
accommodation may include offering a qualified individual with a disability a limited

5

Before the District Court, UPMC advanced four arguments, including that the EEOC
made no showing of how the requested information was relevant to its investigation of
Gailey‟s charge. Because it concluded that the subpoena sought information was not
relevant to Gailey‟s charge, the Court did not address UPMC‟s other arguments, and
neither do we.
6

amount of additional leave, whether paid or unpaid, regardless whether such an
accommodation would violate an otherwise universally applied “neutral” employment
policy. See Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 185 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing
cases).
The EEOC‟s power to prevent unlawful employment practices includes the
investigation of charges of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 12117(a). To aid
its investigation, it may issue administrative subpoenas. See id. § 2000e-9; 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1). Because the EEOC‟s investigative authority is not plenary, it is only entitled to
subpoena evidence “relevant to the charge under investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).
We recently detailed the breadth of the relevancy requirement in Kronos. “Courts
have given broad construction to the term „relevant‟ and have traditionally allowed the
EEOC access to any material that „might cast light on the allegations against the
employer.‟” Kronos, 620 F.3d at 296 (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54,
6869 (1984)) (emphasis added). For example, the EEOC may subpoena “information
that „may provide a useful context‟ for evaluating employment practices under
investigation, in particular when such information constitutes comparison data.” Id. at
298 (quoting EEOC v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 643 F.2d 983, 98586 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Indeed, the scope of the subpoenaed information may reflect the extent to which an
employer uses a particular practice, even if the use is nationwide. Id. (“An employer‟s
nationwide use of a practice under investigation supports a subpoena for nationwide data
on that practice.”). In addition, “[o]nce the EEOC begins an investigation, it is not
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required to ignore facts that support additional claims of discrimination if it uncovers
such evidence during the course of a reasonable investigation of the charge.” Id. at 297.
The relevancy requirement, however, does not confer “unconstrained investigative
authority” on the EEOC, whose burden it is to show relevance. Id. (quoting Shell Oil,
466 U.S. at 6465). Rather, the “power of investigation is anchored in the charge of
discrimination . . . . The relevance requirement „is designed to cabin the EEOC‟s
authority and prevent fishing expeditions.‟” Id. (quoting EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted).
However, the relevance requirement is not demanding. Id. at 296. As such, a
district court‟s role in a subpoena enforcement proceeding is limited. It should not assess
the likelihood that the EEOC will be able to prove the discrimination claims it is
pursuing. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72 n.26; EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775
F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] . . . rejected the proposition
that a district court must find the charge of discrimination to be well-founded, verifiable,
or based on reasonable suspicion before enforcing an EEOC subpoena.”). Moreover, the
EEOC is not limited to investigating the allegations stated in the charge. “[Its]
investigatory power is broader than the four corners of the charge; it encompasses not
only the factual allegations contained in the charge, but also any information that is
relevant to the charge. . . . [T]he EEOC need not cabin its investigation to a literal
reading of the allegations in the charge.” Kronos, 620 F.3d at 299. Likewise, the charge
does not need to contain the legal theory under which the EEOC proceeds. “[T]he
individuals who draft charges are often „not well [versed] in the art of legal description‟
8

and as a result, „the scope of the original charge should be liberally construed.‟ . . . [I]t is
up to the EEOC . . . to investigate whether and under what legal theories discrimination
might have occurred.” Id. at 300 (quoting Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 965
(3d Cir. 1978)).
Though the District Court quoted Kronos for the applicable principles to assess the
EEOC‟s authority to enforce a subpoena, its application of those principles to the
EEOC‟s subpoena against UPMC is more circumscribed than Kronos requires. First, the
Court stated that the “EEOC has failed to satisfactorily explain how the information
requested in the Subpoena would „cast light‟ on Gailey‟s claim.” EEOC v. UPMC, 2011
WL 2118274, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2011) (emphasis added). Under Kronos, the
EEOC is entitled to access any material that might cast light on the charge. 620 F.3d at
296. Second, the Court did not address how the EEOC failed to meet its burden to
demonstrate relevance. Third, the Court emphasized the dearth of evidence that Gailey
requested an accommodation or would have been able to perform her job duties even
with a reasonable accommodation, and the EEOC‟s seeming lack of other investigation
into Gailey‟s charge. These inquiries deal with the likelihood that the EEOC will be able
to prove the claims it pursues based on Gailey‟s charge. That is not a district court‟s
charge in considering relevance. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72 n.26 (“[A]ny effort by the
court to assess the likelihood that the [EEOC] would be able to prove the claims made in
the charge would be reversible error.”). Moreover, though such evidence and
investigation most likely will be crucial to the EEOC‟s case regarding Gailey‟s charge,
the EEOC is not cabined in its investigation by the specific allegations of and evidence
9

supporting a charge if facts that support additional claims of discrimination are uncovered
in the course of a reasonable investigation, provided that its investigation of those
additional claims is relevant to or might cast light on the underlying charge.
To recap, Gailey‟s charge alleged that she was terminated without warning at the
end of her PLOA based on her disability. Heritage responded that she was discharged in
accordance with UPMC‟s (not merely Heritage‟s) personal leave policy. Extrapolating
from Gailey‟s alleged situation, the EEOC questioned whether UPMC, across all its
facilities, was engaging in a pattern of discrimination by relying on a “neutral”
application of its leave policies to terminate individuals with disabilities without
engaging with them to determine if reasonable accommodations existed, potentially in
violation of the ADA.
The EEOC argues that evidence of such a pattern of terminating employees may
provide a context for, and thereby might cast light on, Gailey‟s charge. The District
Court may be correct that the EEOC is interested in pursuing an investigation of UPMC‟s
corporate policies. But if the EEOC meets its burden to demonstrate that the information
is relevant to Gailey‟s charge, as it construes her allegations, it is entitled to an order
enforcing the subpoena notwithstanding that the information may allow it to explore
other claims of discrimination against UPMC.
For these reasons, and though what the District Court did here reflected a practical
concern about possible overreach by the EEOC, we follow our precedent in Kronos.
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Thus we vacate the District Court‟s judgment and remand the case for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.6

6

Because we vacate and remand to allow the Court to reconsider the issue of relevance
under the standard set in Kronos, we do not address whether the EEOC has met its
burden regarding the other requirements that we have set forth for administrative
subpoenas. See Kronos, 620 F.3d at 296 n.4 (“To obtain enforcement of an
administrative subpoena, an agency must demonstrate that: 1) its investigation has a
legitimate purpose, 2) the inquiry is relevant to that purpose, 3) the agency does not
already possess the information requested, 4) the agency has complied with relevant
administrative requirements, and 5) the demand is not „unreasonably broad or
burdensome.‟” (citation omitted)).
11

